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It is widely believed by policymakers and scholars alike that a deep aversion against the use 
of nuclear weapons has taken hold around the world in the years since 1945. Indeed, many 
have even referred to the existence of a “nuclear taboo.” Unfortunately, we lack empirical 
evidence about the strength of such “antinuclear instincts” and the conditions under which 
they might or might not operate in the U.S public and in other nations. 
 
With funding from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts 
for countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Scott D. Sagan at the Center for International 
Security and Cooperation at Stanford University undertook a project to conduct original 
research on public attitudes toward nuclear weapons use, the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC), 
and just war doctrine principles. Utilizing the survey experiment methodology, we2 studied the 
specific scenarios in which the U.S. public and the Indian public would support the use of 
nuclear weapons or exert a constraining influence. The project evaluated how the following 
four factors influence public support for the use of nuclear and conventional weapons: 1) the 
impact of specific threats made by leaders (the commitment trap); 2) the significance of the 
kind of adversary target (foreign government or non-state group); (3) the importance of the 
“principle of proportionality” and saving the lives of one’s own soldiers compared to sparing 
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the lives of non-combatants in an adversary’s state; and (4) the influence of the principle of 
noncombatant immunity in general.  
 
This project had two main deliverables: (1) survey experiments studying the conditions under 
which the American and Indian publics support the use of nuclear weapons and whether the 
public is strongly constrained by the LOAC and just war doctrine; (2) research publications and 
a policy outreach program, including at least one research paper submission to an influential 
scholarly journal and policy-focused publications and briefings with the aim of reaching a wider 
policy audience. 
 
The timeline for completion of key project milestones included in our technical proposal was 
calculated based on an anticipated award start date of May 1, 2014. Because the award 
period began on August 11, 2014, completion dates for milestones were pushed back 
slightly. The survey experiments studying the U.S. public opinion were successful, and we have 
so far produced four research papers, one of which has been accepted for publication, and a 
published policy-focused piece based on our research findings.  
 
We did, however, encounter several challenges with the Indian polling company, IPSOS. Due 
to technical difficulties, we are still awaiting the survey results from India, and can therefore 
not report on the analysis of the Indian public opinion on the use of nuclear weapons and just 
war doctrine yet. We anticipate the survey experiment data to be completed by December 1, 
2015, and have planned analysis and policy outreach meetings in India by the end of 




In order to study the micro-foundations of public willingness to use force against non-
combatants, and to investigate public opinion on the tradeoff between killing civilians in the 
adversary state and saving the lives of own troops, we conducted survey experiments 
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studying the conditions under which the American public’s support the use of nuclear 
weapons, conventional attacks, and whether the public is strongly constrained by principles 
of just war doctrine. Upon publication, the results of each of these surveys will made 
available on-line for the use of other scholars. 
 
We developed and deployed our set of U.S. survey experiments through YouGov/Polimetrix3 
in two rounds. The first round of polling was conducted in August 5-11, 2014, and we received 
the polling results for round one on August 14, 2015. The second round of polling was 
deployed in July 23-30, 2015, and we received the survey results on August 2, 2015. The 
experiments included: 1) An experiment assessing the impact of specific threats made by 
leaders on U.S. public support for use of nuclear and conventional weapons against North 
Korea in the event of North Korean chemical weapons use; 2) An experiment assessing U.S. 
public views on the use of nuclear and conventional weapons against Iranian nuclear facilities 
to halt Iran’s nuclear program; 3) An experiment assessing the impact of the size of Iran’s 
nuclear arsenal on public support for different types of U.S. responses to Iranian aggression 
in the Persian Gulf; and 4) A set of experiments assessing the alignment of the U.S. public’s 
views with just war doctrine principles—including the principle of proportionality, distinction 
and due care — in decisions to support the use of force against military targets.  
 
Prior to deploying our U.S. and Indian surveys, we consulted a small group of specialists— 
Brad Roberts (former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile 
Defense Policy), Vipin Narang (MIT), Neil Joeck (University of California-Berkeley), and 
Zachary Davis (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)— for feedback on the scenarios and 
survey design.  
 
The results from these experiments indicated that while the commitment trap does exert 
some influence on public opinion, these effects are often dwarfed by other concerns such as 
pre-existing views on the use of nuclear force in high-stakes scenarios involving potential 
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nuclear use. We found that in scenarios set in North Korea and Iran, the U.S. public was 
more influenced by concerns about projected military effectiveness of various options, rather 
than leaders’ previous statements of intent. Interestingly, we found little evidence that North 
Korea’s initial development of an “existential deterrent” based on uncertainly about whether 
it had a hidden nuclear bomb prior to the 2006 test, nor in Iran’s possession of a single 
nuclear weapon in the future, strongly affects American public willingness to attack their 
nuclear programs or to respond to conventional provocations. Public opinion is therefore not 
likely to serve as a constraint on the U.S. government’s willingness to respond to challenges 
by a nuclear-armed adversary until that state has developed a secure second strike nuclear 
arsenal. We have also found that the American public is willing to significantly increase the 
number of foreign non-combatants deliberately killed, if the attack is expected to signal 
others not to behave in ways antithetical to U.S. national security interests. 
 
In April 2015, we finalized a set of survey experiments to be deployed in India to shed light 
on public support for nuclear use as outlined by current Indian nuclear doctrine. The first line 
of experiments explored how different types of provocation on the part of Pakistan – 
including tactical nuclear use against Indian forces both within Pakistani and Indian territory 
– might influence the Indian public’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against Pakistani 
targets. The second set of experiments tested the presence of the nuclear taboo among the 
Indian public by asking respondents to indicate preference for and approval of nuclear versus 
conventional strikes in hypothetical military crises. The third and final set of India surveys 
gauged Indian public support for preemptive nuclear strikes against Pakistan and China in 
hypothetical military crises. The drafts of these surveys were finalized and Stanford University 
negotiated the polling Contract with IPSOS. We were forced to postpone deployment of our 
India surveys to April 10, 2015, to allow time for finalization of an agreement and 
securement of IRB approval from Stanford for this international survey work.  
 
We received the initial survey data from IPSOS, our Indian polling company, in mid-April 
2015. There were, unfortunately, apparent technical problems in the surveys done in smaller 
 5 
villages and in the translation of the survey into multiple Indian languages leading us to lack 
confidence in the survey results from fieldwork in Delhi, Jaipur, Chennai, and Mumbai. The 
technical challenges we faced with IPSOS made it difficult for us to reach the milestones we 
had set for the India research. Fortunately, we reached an understanding with IPSOS, which 
will relaunch the survey experiments using internet polling techniques in English to 
supplement the door to door polling that we had initially planned. These surveys will be more 
reliable in their content, though we recognize that the population will over-represent the 
Indian elite rather than the general public. These survey results are scheduled to be ready by 
December 1, 2015, and we have scheduled a policy outreach trip to New Delhi, using funds 
from another grant, for late December 2016.  
 
Scholarly Articles and Policy-Focused Publications 
 
The second main deliverables of the project were to write up the results of the survey 
experiments in research papers as well as publishing a policy-focused piece and briefing the 
results to policy audiences.  
 
In the first quarter of 2015, we wrote the paper “Just a War Theory? American Public Opinion 
on Ethics in Military Combat.” In this paper, Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino explore the 
“micro-foundations” of American views on the use of military force and the extent to which 
the American public’s views are consistent with the Laws of Armed conflict and the principles 
of just war doctrine. In our examination of attitudes towards the jus in bello principle of 
proportionality, we found that Americans are less willing to inflict collateral deaths on foreign 
civilians when the military advantage derived from destroying a target is lower. Regarding 
the principle of due care, we found that many Americans are willing to risk the deaths of U.S. 
soldiers to prevent a larger number of enemy civilian deaths. However, the public’s 
commitment to the principles of proportionality and due care was very biased in favor of 
protecting American lives and national security interests, which suggest only limited support 
for traditional interpretations of just war theory. Furthermore, we found little evidence that 
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the public supports the principle of distinction (non-combatant immunity) and that many 
Americans consider any foreign civilian who supports an adversary’s government to be a 
legitimate target, which would be a violation of the Laws of Armed Conflict.  
 
In the second quarter of 2015, we revised this draft paper based on the preliminary findings 
from the just war doctrine experiments. The paper was revised to reflect feedback gathered 
from presentations at Stanford University, the University of Notre Dame, the University of 
Indiana, and the University of Minnesota. We submitted the paper to the journal 
International Organization (IO). IO did not accept the article, but we received valuable 
feedback from the reviewers and have since revised the paper and are submitting it to the 
influential scholarly journal World Politics.  
 
A second project paper -- Benjamin Valentino’s “Moral Character or Character of War? 
American Public Opinion on the Targeting of Civilians in Times of War” -- examined why 
America has maintained the policy of relative restraint, when none of its adversaries possess 
the capability to retaliate against the United States. Drawing on historical material and the 
survey experiments conducted as part of the PASCC project, he suggested that the 
transformation of U.S. war efforts could be explained by the shift in the norms surrounding 
the targeting of civilians; by the changing views about the effectiveness of targeting civilian 
populations and the public favoring the minimization of non-combatant casualties as a key to 
victory in counter-insurgency warfare; and the drop in American military fatalities since World 
War II, which reduces the temptation to end war quickly with large-scale attacks. Valentino 
highlighted that the important change has not been in the moral character of Americans, but 
rather the changing character of wars that America has fought, especially since Vietnam. The 
paper was reviewed at a conference at West Point in November 2015 and has now been 
accepted for publication in the Fall 2016 special issue of the journal Daedalus produced by 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Technology, Ethics, and War project. 
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In addition we wrote the piece “Crossing the Nuclear Line: American Attitudes on Using Force 
Against Proliferating States” (co-authored with Benjamin P. Buch, Stanford University), in 
which we explore the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. In this paper, we challenge the 
conventional claim of “existential deterrence”, which suggests that once a potential adversary 
has developed a nuclear bomb, military options are taken off the table. Drawing on historical 
evidence and two survey experiments, we conclude that the U.S. government and public are 
not deterred from launching a strike on an adversary, in the early stages of that adversary’s 
development of a nuclear arsenal. We presented the paper at the 2015 Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association and plan to submit the paper to the Journal of 
Conflict Resolution for potential publication this winter.  
 
We have also written a working paper based on the survey experiments of the U.S. public 
opinion on nuclear weapons use and just war principles, entitled “Atomic Attraction: 
Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran”. In October 2015, the paper was presented at seminars at MIT, 
Princeton, the Belfer Center at Harvard, and at the Just War Conference in Monterey, 
organized by the NPS.  The paper demonstrates, contrary to wide-spread views among policy 
makers and scholars, that there is only weak acceptance of a “nuclear taboo”, and that a 
large majority of the U.S. public is willing to use nuclear weapons against Iran if such use is 
considered necessary to avoid the deaths of U.S. military personal through ground attacks in 
any future war. We plan to submit the piece for publication in a major journal in early 2016. 
 
Finally, in July 2015, we published a policy-focused piece in OpenGlobalRights - a multi-
lingual, online forum for human rights activists, commentators and academics. By publishing 
the policy piece, entitled “Use of Force: the American Public and the Ethics of War”, we 






Policy Outreach Meetings 
 
By briefing policymakers about potential public support for and constraints against the use of 
force and the public interest in following the Laws of Armed Conflict and the principles of just 
war doctrine, we have encouraged more informed discussions about when military force 
should be used in realistic scenarios.  
 
The work of this project was featured in three important policy outreach events. First, in 
March 2015, Scott Sagan presented a briefing, based on this survey research and earlier 
historical case study work, to Admiral Cecil Haney and his staff at the United States Strategic 
Command. Second, in April 2015, Scott Sagan delivered a well-attended talk, entitled “Atomic 
Aversion and Just War Principles: New Evidence on U.S. Public Opinion,” at the Woodrow 
Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., for Washington based academics and policymakers. 
Third, in September 2015, Scott Sagan was invited to present a special briefing to General 
Joseph Dunford, the incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the Pentagon. He 
spoke about public opinion based on these surveys, and the need to take into account the 
U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and Negative Security Assurances in the context of the of 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. General Dunford sent a letter to Scott 
Sagan after the briefing, in which he said: “Many thanks for meeting with me to discuss 
nuclear deterrence. I appreciate your insightful perspective on how our adversaries may view 
levels of conflict differently and how our use of certain phrases may not translate as 
intended. Your thoughts will help shape my future engagements and speech.”  
 
Finally, we note that this award did not include funding for outreach events. However, as 
outlined in the project milestones, Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino are scheduled to 
travel to India in December 2015, and hold academic seminars and policy outreach meetings 




Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
 
The survey experiments have shed new light on the sources of the American publics 
willingness to support the use of military forces and the constraints imposed by the Laws of 
Armed Conflict and the principles of just war doctrine. We have discovered that there is only 
limited public support for following principles of non-combatant immunity, proportionality, 
and due care in both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons operations, and that 
significant portions of the U.S. public supports military options that arguably violate the Laws 
of Armed Conflict and just war principles. There is little evidence that the “nuclear taboo” has 
a strong constraining influence on the U.S. public.    
 
We currently lack full evidence on whether the Indian public and elites hold similar views. We 
learned that translation difficulties and technical challenges of interviewing door to door in 
remote villages in Indian make internet surveys in English a preferred option, despite the 
results being more representative of elite opinion rather than broader Indian public opinion.  
We look forward to getting the Indian data soon and to presenting our findings in New Delhi 
in December 2015.  
 
We thank the PASCC funders for their support in producing this innovative, rigorous, and 
policy-relevant research. We are pleased that there has been such high level interest in our 
findings, as evidenced by the briefings to the senior military leaders of the United States. We 
look forward to continuing the analysis of the data, publishing the research, and conducting 
further policy briefings on U.S. public opinion and nuclear weapons in the coming year. 
 
 
 
 
 
